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Abstract
We study an auction where two licenses to operate on a new market are sold,
and winning bidders finance their bids on the debt market. Higher bids imply higher
debts, which affects product market competition. We compare our results to those
of a beauty contest and a standard auction. For the case that debt induces firms
to compete more aggressively, we find that consumer prices are lower, and expected
firm profits are strictly positive although firms are a priori identical. When debt
induces firms to compete less aggressively, we find that firms make zero profits, and
consumer prices are higher.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, license auctions in the US and Europe sparked a huge interest from
both academics and the general public. In the US, the FCC auctioned licenses to use the
electromagnetic spectrum for personal communication services. Between July 1994 and
July 1998, 16 auctions were held, where 5,893 licenses were sold. Total revenues amounted
to $22.9 billion dollars.1 Throughout Europe, licenses for ”third generation” (3G) mobile
telecommunication (or UMTS) took place during 2000 and 2001.2 These auctions, held
in 9 countries, raised over $100 billion, or over 1.5% of GDP. The revenue per inhabitant
differed greatly per country.3 Currently, European countries prepare to auction off the 3G
expansion band.4
Traditional auction theory5 may not be the most appropriate framework to study these
auctions. Indeed, Klemperer (2002b) argues that in analyses of license auctions based on
this literature, often too much attention is given to technicalities concerning asymmetric
information, and too little attention to market structure and industrial organization as-
pects. Traditional models typically assume that for each bidder the value of the object that
is being auctioned is fixed and given. In a license auction, this is often not the case. Here,
firms bid on the right to compete on a market. The willingness to pay for that right will
depend on the characteristics of the aftermarket (see e.g. Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003).
For example, a firm is willing to pay a higher amount to compete against an inefficient firm
than it is to compete against an efficient firm, simply because its profits will be higher in
the former case. Bidding behavior in a license auction can also be affected by the market
structure that exists before the auction. Incumbents may be inclined to pre-empt new
entry in the market. The ability to do so will depend on the auction format (Hoppe et
1Cramton and Schwartz (2000); for more on the design of these auctions, see e.g. McAfee and McMillan
(1996), or McMillan (1994).
2See Van Damme (2002), or Bo¨rgers and Dustmann (2003).
3Klemperer (2002a).
4See The Economist (2005).
5For a survey see Wolfstetter (1996), or Klemperer (1999).
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al., 2006). Also, the bid that a firm submits in an auction may serve as a signal for some
private information that is relevant for the aftermarket (Goeree, 2003).
This paper studies another important characteristic of the post-auction interaction
between firms that affects their bidding behavior in a license auction. One striking aspect
of license auctions is that winning firms often have to take on debt to be able to finance
their bid (see e.g. The Economist, 2002). From the industrial organization literature, it
is well-known that the competitive behavior of a firm is affected by the amount of debt
that it holds. In a seminal article, Brander and Lewis (1986) study a model in which firms
hold debt and compete in Cournot fashion. Firms face uncertainty with respect to e.g. the
level of marginal costs. After output decisions have been made, uncertainty is resolved.
Each firm has limited liability. If operating profits fall short of its debt level, the firm is
simply not able to repay its debt, and hence has a zero net profit. This will be the case
if marginal costs turn out to be high. A firm that maximizes net profits will thus focus
on cases with low marginal costs when making its output decision. This implies that it
will choose a higher output than it would without limited liability. In other words, in this
context, more debt induces firms to compete more aggressively. Yet, there may also be
cases in which more debt induces firms to compete less aggressively (Showalter, 1995).
In license auctions, the bid of a firm will depend on the profits it expects to make in
the aftermarket. But that profit will depend on the debt levels that the winners of the
auction take on. In turn, these debt levels depend on the bids in the auction stage. In
this paper, we model this issue. Two licenses to operate on some new market are being
auctioned. The two winners of the auction will establish a duopoly, and finance their
bids on a competitive debt market. A number of a priori identical firms participate in
the auction. After the auction, and after financing the bids, the two winners compete on
the market. We assume that firms have symmetric but incomplete information concerning
some aspect of the aftermarket. When firms place higher bids, they also have to take on
higher debts, which in turn affects their behavior on the product market. Firms take all
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these effects into account when placing their bids. We study how bidding behavior on the
auction market is ultimately affected, and the prices and profits that will ultimately result.
Our model yields some surprising insights. Consider the case in which debt induces
firms to compete more aggressively. We find that the winners of the auction then have
expected profits that are strictly positive. This is surprising since a priori all firms are
identical and our model does not have asymmetric information. Hence, one would expect
profits to be driven down to zero. This is not the case. Effectively, the equilibrium of our
model exhibits credit rationing. Winning bidders, even though they make positive expected
profits, will not be outbid. Any higher bid would yield a debt level that implies negative
net expected profits for debtholders. A higher level of debt induces firms to compete more
aggressively on the product market, reducing the probability that the debt will be repaid.
Therefore, the supply curve of debt is backward bending. Thus, a firm would be willing to
bid more if it could obtain funding, but it cannot.
With respect to license auctions, one of the main concerns in the popular press is that
their use will increase consumer prices. Firms will recoup the costs of licenses by simply
adding a mark-up to consumer prices, the argument goes. Of course, this argument is
invalid, as prices paid at an auction are simply sunk costs. In our model, higher fees even
lead to lower prices. This is due to the strategic effect of debt: as firms take on more debt,
they will compete more aggressively on the product market.6 Thus, consumer prices in
our model are lower than in a beauty contest, or in a situation where winners can finance
their bids out of internal funds and do not have to resort to the debt market to finance
their bids.
Yet, as already mentioned, there are cases in which debt induces firms to compete
less aggressively, e.g. in a world with price setting and uncertainty about demand (see
Showalter 1995). In that case, debts cannot be repaid if demand turns out to be low. In
setting their price, firms thus focus on cases with high demand, which implies that they
6We also made this argument, but only intuitively, in Haan and Toolsema (2000).
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set higher prices than they would do in a case without debt. Such a framework has the
following implications for our model. First, winners of the auction have zero expected
profits, as there is no credit rationing. Second, equilibrium consumer prices are higher
than they are in a case were firms obtain their license for free. Third, winning bids are
higher with debt than they are when firms have internal funds.
A few papers study other aspects of the interplay between debt and auctions. Chowdhry
and Nanda (1993) also study the strategic role of debt in an auction – but in a context
entirely different from ours. They study a takeover contest, in which many raiders bid to
take over a firm. Clayton and Ravid (2002) study the effect of the initial debt level of
a firm on its bidding behavior in the US FCC auctions. They find that, as debt levels
increase, firms tend to reduce their bids. Note however that they study the amount of debt
a firm already has when the auction takes place. We study the amount of debt a firm has
to take on as a consequence of winning the auction. Moreover, in our model, the amount
of debt is endogenously determined. In Zheng’s (2001) model, bidders differ with respect
to the amount of funds that they have. Firms with lower funds have to take on higher
debts upon winning the auction. That implies that these bidders are willing to risk more,
and therefore bid more aggressively. It also implies that the winners of the auction are
exactly those bidders that are more likely to go bankrupt. In Zheng (2001), limited liability
therefore has a direct effect on bidding behavior. In our model, the effect is indirect, and
operates via the competition stage that takes place after the auction.
In our paper, we primarily focus on the first case sketched above, where debt induces
firms to compete more aggressively. In the next section, we present that model. We do not
specify the exact mode of competition. It suffices to put some weak assumptions on the
equilibrium profits of the competition stage. In section 3 we solve the model. In section
4 we summarize our main results, and we give some numerical examples in section 5.
These examples cover the cases of Hotelling, Bertrand, and Cournot competition. Section




We consider a three-stage model. In the first stage, the auction stage, N > 2 bidders
compete in a sealed-bid license auction, where winning bidders pay their own bid. Bidders
are ex ante identical. The two highest bidders obtain a license to operate in a new market.
Without loss of generality, the highest bidder will be denoted firm 1 and the second highest
bidder will be denoted firm 2. Their bids are denoted b1 and b2. In the case of ties, winners
will be decided by coin toss. In stage 2, the debt stage, the two winning firms finance their
bids on a perfectly competitive debt market. Firm i obtains an amount bi to pay for its
bid, against the promise of repaying di at the end of the game. We assume that if it is not
the case that both firms are able to secure financing in the debt stage, then the auction
will be declared void, and a new auction will be held. In stage 3, the competition stage,
the two winning firms compete on the output market, where they face uncertainty. After
firms have chosen their strategic actions, uncertainty is resolved, consumers make their
purchase decisions and, if possible, debts are repaid. Without loss of generality, we assume
no discounting.
The strategic effect of debt may work in two opposite directions. More debt may result
in more aggressive competition, that is, higher quantities and lower prices. This is the
case, for example, with Cournot competition and uncertainty about either marginal cost or
demand (Brander and Lewis, 1986), and with Bertrand competition and uncertainty about
marginal cost (Showalter, 1995). However, it may also be the case that more debt results
in less aggressive competition, that is, in lower quantities and higher prices. This is the
case, for example, with Bertrand competition and uncertainty about demand (Showalter,
1995). In this paper, we mainly focus on the former case. The latter case is solved in
section 6. For simplicity, we assume in our model that firms can only take on debt to
finance their bids in the license auction. Hence, we do not allow firms to take on debt
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solely for strategic reasons, as they do in the literature referred to above.
In the remainder of this section, we give a detailed description of the three stages of the
model: the auction stage, the debt stage, and the competition stage. We describe these
stages in the same order as we solve the model: by backward induction, starting with the
last stage. We then give a formal definition of the equilibrium concept that we use. We
end with some technical assumptions.
Competition stage In this stage, the two firms that have won the auction in stage 1,
and managed to obtain funding, compete on the output market. Products are substitutes.
Demand functions are downward sloping. Firms compete by simultaneously choosing an
action a, which may refer to either price or quantity. Let ai ≥ 0 denote the action chosen
by firm i. Operating profits of each firm will depend on the actions chosen by both firms,
and the realization of some random variable ω. Firm is operating profits are denoted
pii(ai, aj, ω), which is continuous and strictly concave in ai.
The uncertainty reflected by ω may concern e.g. the marginal costs firms will incur,
or the level of demand that they will face. We use the convention that higher values of ω





If the uncertainty concerns marginal costs, low ω thus reflects low marginal costs. If the
uncertainty concerns demand, low ω reflects high demand. The realization of ω is drawn
from a continuously differentiable, strictly positive probability density function f(ω) with
domain [ω, ω¯]. As usual, we assume that pii is strictly concave in ai. For expositional
convenience, we also assume that pii (ai, aj, ω¯) ≥ 0 for all relevant ai and aj.
Firms face limited liability. Firm i can just repay its debt di if ω is such that pii (ai, aj, ω) =
di. In that case, operating profits are just sufficient to cover the promised repayment di.
Denote the value of ω for which this equality is satisfied as ωˆi(ai, aj, di). If ω ≤ ωˆi(ai, aj, di),
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firm i is able to fully repay its debt. Debtholders then receive di. Thus, with ω ∈
(ωˆi(ai, aj, di), ω¯], the firm makes positive operating profits, but these are insufficient to
repay the debt di. In that case, all operating profits will be paid to the debtholders, and
the firm’s net profits are zero.
We denote the expected net profits of firm i, i.e. after the repayment of its debt, as
Πi(ai, aj, di). We thus have
Πi(ai, aj, di) =
∫ ωˆi(ai,aj ,di)
ω
(pii (ai, aj, ω)− di) f(ω) dω. (1)
We look for a Nash equilibrium in the competition subgame, and assume existence, unique-
ness and stability of that equilibrium.
Debt stage In the debt stage, the two firms that have won the auction have to find
debtholders willing to lend them the money to pay for their bids. A winning firm has
submitted a bid bi ≥ 0. A debt contract can be represented by (bi, di): firm i receives the
amount bi now, in return for the promise to repay di at the end of the game. Since we
assume a perfectly competitive debt market, firms can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
debtholders. For ease of exposition, we will write ωˆi(di, dj) ≡ ωˆi(a∗i (di, dj), a∗j(dj, di), di).
Also, we define the continuation profits as pi∗i (di, dj, ω) ≡ pii(a∗i (di, dj), a∗j(dj, di), ω). The
expected repayment to debtholders Ri(di, dj) can then be written as
Ri(di, dj) = Pr(ω ≤ ωˆi(di, dj))di +
∫ ω¯
ωˆi(di,dj)
pi∗i (di, dj, ω)f(ω) dω. (2)
Here, the subscript i denotes that these debtholders lend to firm i. The expected net profits
to debtholders now equal Ri(di, dj) − bi. The expected net profits of firm i at this stage
can be written as
Πi(di, dj) ≡ Πi(a∗i (di, dj), a∗j(dj, di), di) =
∫ ωˆi(di,dj)
ω
(pi∗i (di, dj, ω)− di) f(ω) dω. (3)
Firms 1 and 2 simultaneously set d1 and d2 such that their expected profits are maximized,
given what will occur in the competition stage. If it is not the case that both firms are
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able to secure financing, then the auction will be declared void and a new auction will be
held. Thus, a firm that is able to secure financing will also lose its license if its competitor
is not able to do so. Without making this assumption, a firm could simply submit a bid in
the auction that is so high that the debt market is only willing to finance that bid if the
other firm does not obtain financing. A firm is then able to effectively shut any competitor
out of the market and obtain a monopoly.7
Auction stage In the auction stage, N > 2 identical firms submit a bid to obtain a
license. Firm k submits Bk, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Expected net profits of firm k at the auction
stage can then be denoted ΠAk (B1, . . . BN). The highest bid is b1 ≡ max(B1, . . . , BN), the
second highest bid b2 ≡ max (B1, . . . , BN) \{b1}. In case ties occur, we define T as the
number of firms that have submitted the same bid as the second-highest bidder: T ≡
#{k|Bk = b2}. Note that the highest bidder may also be among these. Given the vector
of bids, the probability of obtaining a license for firm k now equals
Pk(B1, . . . , BN) =

0 if Bk < b2
1
T
if Bk = b2 < b1
2
T
if Bk = b1 = b2
1 if Bk = b1 > b2
and we have
ΠAk (B1, . . . , BN) = Pk(B1, . . . , BN) · Πi(d∗i (Bk, B−k)), d∗j(B−k, Bk)), (4)
with B−k = max (B1, . . . BN) \ {Bk} .
Equilibrium concept Putting together all the elements of the three subgames, we
can now define the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game as follows:
7To be really precise, we also have to make the assumption that if an auction is rescheduled, the original
winners both incur additional costs ε, which can be infinitely small. Without this additional assumption,
we have an infinite number of equilibria in which all firms always submit very high bids, and the auction
is never resolved.
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Definition 1 A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game described above consists
of bids (B∗1 , . . . B
∗








2) for the two
highest bidders, such that we have:





j , di), (5)
for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i, and Πi(ai, aj, di) as defined in (1);



















j , di) ≥ bj, (6)
for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i, and Ri(di, dj) as defined in (2);









k+1, . . . , B
∗
N)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . .N}, with ΠAk (B1, , . . . , BN) as defined in (4).
Further technicalities There are cases in which a firm cannot possibly make strictly
positive profits. As the amount of debt di that a firm holds increases, there is a point where
it is impossible for firm i to make strictly positive net profits regardless of the action ai that
it chooses, even if we are in the most favorable state of the world, so if ω = ω. Formally,
for any dj there is a d˜i (dj) such that pi
∗
i (d˜i (dj) , dj, ω) = d˜i (dj). For firm i to be able to
make strictly positive expected profits, we need di < d˜i(dj). If this is not satisfied, then
any action ai will yield a zero profit. For technical convenience, we assume that for any
di ≥ d˜i (dj), we have a∗i (di, dj) = limD↗d˜i(dj) a∗ (D, dj). Thus, the firm will choose the
same action that it would choose with the highest di that could still yield positive profits.
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Consider an increase in the debt level of a firm’s competitor. For our analysis, we
require that this has an unambiguous effect on the firm’s operating profits, independent of
the realization of the random variable ω. Thus:
Assumption 1 The derivative
∂pi∗i (di,dj ,ω)
∂dj
has the same sign for all ω, di.
Suppose that both firms have the same debt level d. We will refer to such a case as one
with a common debt level. We make a similar assumption as the one above for a change
in that common debt level:
Assumption 2 The derivative
dpi∗i (d,d,ω)
dd
has the same sign for all ω.
For the bulk of this paper, we will consider the case in which more debt induces firms
to compete more aggressively. We will show that the following assumption is sufficient for
that to hold:
Assumption 3 Marginal profit is strictly decreasing in ω. That is, ∂
2pii
∂ω∂qi
< 0, with qi the
quantity sold by firm i.
In section 6, we consider the opposite case, in which more debt makes firms compete
less aggressively. In section 5, we show that the assumptions above are satisfied for the
cases of Hotelling, Bertrand and Cournot competition with cost uncertainty and linear
demand, and also for Cournot competition with demand uncertainty and linear demand.
3 Solving the model
3.1 Preliminaries
To derive the equilibrium of our model, we need some preliminary results, which we estab-
lish in a number of lemmas. All proofs are in the appendix.
First, with quantity competition, more debt induces a firm to compete more aggres-
sively, in the sense that its best-reply function shifts upwards. With more debt, a given
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output of the competitor will lead to a higher output for this firm. Also, with price compe-
tition, more debt induces a firm to compete more aggressively, but that now implies that its
best-reply function shifts downwards. With more debt, a given price of the competitor will
lead to a lower price for this firm (Lemma 1). As a result, we have that a firm’s operating
profit decreases if its competitor takes on higher debt (Lemma 2). Formally, denote the
best-reply function of firm i as βi(aj; di).




> 0 if ai ≡ qi and di ∈ [0, d˜i(dj)],
< 0 if ai ≡ pi and di ∈ [0, d˜i(dj)],
= 0 if di > d˜i(dj).
Lemma 2 An increase in a firm’s debt level decreases the competitor’s equilibrium oper-
ating profits:
∂pi∗i (di, dj, ω)
∂dj
{
< 0 if di ∈ [0, d˜i(dj)],
= 0 otherwise,
∀ω ∈ [ω, ω¯].
It will also prove useful to consider the case in which both firms have the same level
of debt d, and to study the effect of an increase in that common debt level. Similar to
d˜i(dj), we can define d˜ as that value of the common debt level for which firms are not able
to make positive profits, regardless of the value of ω. Thus, pi∗i (d˜, d˜, ω) = d˜. Again, we
assume that if d increases beyond d˜ the behavior of the firms does not change. Thus for
any d ≥ d˜, we have a∗ (d, d) = limD↗d˜ a∗ (D,D). Define the expected operating profits of
firm i as follows:
Eω(pi
∗
i (di, dj)) ≡
∫ ω¯
ω
pi∗i (di, dj, ω)f(ω) dω.
Note that firms are a priori identical, so whenever d1 = d2 = d, we may drop the subscript
i. We can now show:
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< 0 if d ∈ [0, d˜],
= 0 otherwise.
Now consider the expected revenues for debtholders:
Lemma 4 An increase in the amount of debt that a firm holds, decreases the expected




< 0 if di ∈ [0, d˜i(dj)],
= 0 otherwise.
The intuition is as follows. From Lemma 2, we have that for every realization of ω, the
operating profits of a firm decrease if its competitor’s debt level increases. Hence, the
probability that the firm will be able to fully repay its debt decreases, as do the profits
that debtholders can capture in case the firm cannot fully repay its debt.
The effect of an increase in a firm’s debt level on its own debtholders’ expected repay-
ment is ambiguous. Yet, we can derive a weaker result that is sufficient for our purposes.
We will refer to the common debt level that maximizes debtholder expected revenues as
dR. If this value is not unique, we define dR as the smallest d for which the maximum of
R(d, d) is reached. Thus
dR ≡ min
{





Suppose that a firm’s competitor has a debt level that is equal to dR, while the firm itself
has a lower debt level. In that case, if we increase the amount of debt of this firm to dR as
well, we can show that the expected revenues of the debtholders of this firm increase:
Lemma 5 We have Ri(di, dR) < Ri(dR, dR) for all di < dR.
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3.2 Equilibrium
We now turn to the equilibrium of the model. In the appendix, we prove the following
results:
Theorem 1 An equilibrium of our model is given by:
1. B∗k = bR ≡ maxdR(d, d), for k = 1, . . . , N,
2. d∗i = dR ≡ min {d : d ∈ argmaxdR(d, d)} , for i = 1, 2,




i ), for i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Theorem 2 In the equilibrium described in Theorem 1, firms make strictly positive ex-
pected net profits.
In a standard auction with symmetric bidders and full information, profits are competed
away in Bertrand-like fashion. In this auction, however, this is not true. Once the bidding
reaches bR, bids will no longer increase. Suppose that a firm does submit a bid higher
than bR. To finance such a bid, the debt this firm has to take on is necessarily higher than
dR. But more debt induces a firm to compete more aggressively on the product market,
which implies that the expected repayment to debtholders is lower. With higher debt, but
a lower expected repayment, expected debtholder profits would then decrease. Since these
are zero in (bR, dR), this implies that any bidder outbidding bR will not be able to find
financing.
In effect, we thus have a backward-bending credit supply curve.8 In general, such a
curve may be caused by adverse selection or moral hazard. With moral hazard, as the
interest rate r increases, firms are inclined to take on riskier projects. At some point, this
effect becomes so strong that the expected repayment to debtholders decreases with an
increase in r, causing the supply of credit to decrease. A similar argument applies in our
8See e.g. Freixas and Rochet (1998, section 5.2).
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model. As the winning firms take on more debt, they compete more aggressively, which
implies that expected operating profits decrease, at some point leading to a lower expected
repayment to debtholders. The reason that in our model expected net profits are positive
thus boils down to credit rationing. The equilibrium of our model occurs at the maximum
of the backward bending credit supply curve. Submitting higher bids would require a
higher expected repayment to debtholders, which is simply not feasible. Hence firms are
still willing to submit higher bids, but are not able to do so since they are denied access
to the credit market when they do.
We can also show:
Theorem 3 The equilibrium described in Theorem 1 is the unique symmetric equilibrium,
provided that the maximizer of R(d, d) is unique. If that is not the case, we still have that
the equilibrium of the auction stage is unique.
Hence, provided that the condition in the theorem is satisfied, our model has a unique
symmetric equilibrium, in which all firms submit the bid. The winning bidders choose
the same debt level. That debt level is the common debt level that maximizes expected
repayment to the debtholders. Yet, debtholders’ net profits are driven to zero. At the
auction stage, firms will increase their bids as long as they are still able to obtain financing,
that is, up to the point where expected net profits of debtholders are zero.
To get some intuition for this result, refer to Figure 1. Here, we depict a firm’s ex-
pected operating profits Eω (pi
∗(d, d)) as a function of the common debt level d. Note
that Eω (pi
∗) is decreasing in d, using Lemma 3. Out of expected operating profits, the
amount R flows to the debtholders. The firm is left with expected net firm profits Π,
which equals the difference between Eω (pi
∗) and R. From the definition of d˜, we have
Eω[pi




. As firms’ behavior does not change beyond d˜, we have that for
all d > d˜, Eω[pi
∗(d, d, ω)] = R (d, d) = Eω[pi∗(d˜, d˜, ω)].
In the Figure, R is decreasing for d slightly smaller than d˜, which implies that dR < d˜.









Figure 1: Solving the model.
operating profits flow to the debtholders. Now suppose that we decrease d slightly to d˜−ε.
Operating profits then increase for all possible realizations of ω. This is good news for
debtholders.9 Hence, R then increases.
The equilibrium of our model is now easy to see. First note that all firms submit the
same bid in equilibrium. Suppose that all firms bid some b0 < bR. The two winning firms
are then able to find financing, since there is a d0 such that R(d0, d0) = b0. Yet, this cannot
be an equilibrium. Suppose that one firm increases its bid to some b1 = b0+ε < bR. A firm is
willing to defect in such manner, since it then wins the auction with certainty, whereas the
expected profits upon winning are hardly affected. Also, both winning firms are still able
to find financing: for example, by both taking on debt dR. Since R(dR, dR) = bR > b1 > b0,
debtholders are willing to sign such contracts. The equilibrium thus necessarily has all
bidders bidding bR, and the winners taking on debt levels dR.
9On the other hand, for ω such that ω < ωˆ, bondholders no longer receive all operating profits. For very
small ω, this implies that they now receive less than in the previous case, but this is only a second-order
effect.
16
4 Comparison with other allocation mechanisms
In this section we discuss the implications of our model for the outcome of the auction,
and for the competitive outcome that results. In particular, we analyze the fees paid at
the auction and the consumer price level in the equilibrium of our model. We compare fees
and prices to those in alternative setups, such as a beauty contest or a standard auction
without external financing.
We first argue that consumer prices are decreasing in the amount of debt of the firms
competing on the market.
Proposition 1 In the competition subgame, if both firms have the same debt level, and if




Proof. This has been shown in the proof of Lemma 3.
Intuitively, debt induces firms to compete more aggressively. Hence, higher debt implies
lower prices. (See e.g. Brander and Lewis, 1986). Now consider the case of a beauty
contest, in which licenses are allocated through some administrative mechanism, at a fee
that equals zero.10 We still assume that firms do not have internal funds.
Corollary 1 A beauty contest leads to higher consumer prices than the auction with ex-
ternal financing does.
Proof. With a beauty contest, d = 0. In the equilibrium of the auction with external
financing, d = dR > 0. The result then follows from Proposition 1.
In the equilibrium of our model the debt level dR is strictly positive, whereas with a beauty
contest licenses are given away for free and d = 0. Since firms compete more aggressively
when they hold debt, consumer prices are lower when licenses are auctioned than when
10Note that in general, a beauty contest can be considered as an all-pay auction, were each participant
has to incur some cost for preparing his application. We ignore such costs.
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they are given away for free in a beauty contest. Note that this result is opposite to what is
often argued in the popular press: that auctions lead to higher consumer prices, since firms
have to ”earn their money back”. That argument boils down to a sunk-cost fallacy (see
e.g. Klemperer, 2002a). In our model, auctions lead to lower prices than beauty contests:
auctions lead to higher debt, and higher debt leads to lower prices.
Our results depend crucially on the strictly positive debt levels that result from the
stage in which the licenses are awarded. For comparison, we now discuss what happens
when firms do have sufficient internal funds.
Corollary 2 When firms have access to sufficient internal funds, license fees paid at an
auction will be higher than when firms have to resort to external finance. Consumer prices
will also be higher.
Proof. In appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. The strategic effect of debt implies that firms that have
debt compete more aggressively than firms that do not. As a result, their expected operat-
ing profits in equilibrium will be lower. With internal funds, expected operating profits are
competed away in the auction. Hence, equilibrium bids equal Eω(pi
∗(0, 0)). With positive
debt levels, equilibrium bids are necessarily lower, as expected operating profits are lower.
Moreover, the firms’ expected profits are not competed away completely. For both reasons,
equilibrium bids in a model with internal funds are higher than those in a model with debt.
Also, equilibrium prices are higher. The intuition for that result is the same as in the case
of a beauty contest.
5 Some numerical examples
In this section, we give some numerical examples. We consider a Hotelling, a Bertrand, and
a Cournot model with cost uncertainty, and a Cournot model with demand uncertainty.
For each case, we first show that Assumptions 1 through 3 are satisfied. Then we solve
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for the equilibrium of our model with debt, and of the model in which winning bids are
financed through internal funds.
5.1 Hotelling competition with cost uncertainty
Suppose that the two winning firms are located on a Hotelling line of unit length, one firm
being located at 0, the other at 1. A mass of consumers, normalized to 1, is uniformly
distributed on the line. Transportation costs are normalized to 1 per unit of distance. The
willingness to pay is v for every consumer, with v high enough so the market is always
covered. Assume that marginal costs c are constant and equal across firms, and drawn
from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Obviously, operating profits are lower if marginal
costs turn out to be higher. We can thus interpret c as the random variable ω in our
analysis. We have f(ω) = 1 and [ω, ω¯] = [0, 1]. Operating profits of firm i now equal
pii(pi, pj, ω) =
1
2





which implies that Assumption 3 is satisfied. Also
ωˆi = pi − 2di
1 + pj − pi .







(1 + pj − pi) (pi − ω)− di
)
dω.
Plugging in ωˆi and pii(pi, pj, ω), this yields
Πi(pi, pj, di) =
(pi (1 + pj − pi)− 2di)2
4 (1 + pj − pi) . (9)
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Yet, plugging either p1i and p
2
i back into the numerator of (9) yields zero profits, which





2 + 24di, which implies that when using p
3
i the denominator of (9) becomes
negative, which implies negative profits. Therefore, p4i is the only relevant solution. From






















In this case, we have price competition. The proof of Lemma 2 then implies that both
p∗i and p
∗
j are decreasing in dj. Also note that dj does have a direct effect on the reaction

























This implies that the large bracketed term on the right-hand side of 10 is strictly positive.
Since we require that pi∗i > 0 for all ω, we have p
∗
i > ω. This implies that Assumption 1 is
satisfied.
Suppose both firms have the same level of debt d. We can then solve for equilibrium
prices to find







This implies that dpi∗i /dd < 0 for all ω, so Assumption 2 is satisfied as well.
For the expected repayment to the debtholders, we have
Ri(di, dj) = Pr(ω ≤ ωˆ)di +
∫ ω¯
ωˆi
pi∗i (di, dj, ω)f(ω) dω = ωˆidi +
∫ 1
ωˆi
pi∗i (di, dj, ω) dω.
With common d, we have
ωˆ = p∗ − 2d = 2− 4d.
Note that the highest possible value for ω is 1. Hence, when d ≤ 1/4, the firms are always
able to repay their debt. The restriction that pi∗i > 0 requires d < 1/2. We thus have:
R(d, d) =
{
d if d ≤ 1
4




(2− 2d− ω) dω if 1
4




d if d ≤ 1
4




< d < 1
2
.
Maximizing with respect to d yields d∗ = 3
8
, b∗ = R(d∗, d∗) = 5
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Firms earn strictly positive expected profits, which equal 1
16
. In a model with internal
funds, equilibrium consumer prices are p∗(0, 0) = 2, which is higher than prices in a model
with debt. The same consumer prices would prevail with a beauty contest. With internal
funds, bids equal bint = Eω(pi
∗(0, 0)) = 3
4
which is higher than in the model with debt, and
expected firm profits are driven to zero.
5.2 Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty
Now consider a model of Bertrand competition among two firms, i = 1, 2, producing
heterogeneous goods. Inverse demand for firm i’s product is given by
pi = 5− qi − 1
2
qj,











Assume that marginal costs c are constant and identical across firms, and drawn from
a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We again interpret c as the random variable ω in our
analysis. Operating profits of firm i are given by
pii(pi, pj, c) =
1
3
(10 + 2pj − 4pi) (pi − ω). (11)
To have pi∗i > 0 for all ω, we thus need p
∗








ωˆi = pi − 3
2
di








(5 + pj − 2pi) (pi − ω)− di
)
dω.




(2pi (5 + pj − 2pi)− 3di)2
5 + pj − 2pi .
Again, taking the first-order condition yields four possible solutions. With the exact same






































With price competition, the proof of Lemma 2 implies that both p∗i and p
∗
j are decreasing
in dj. Also note that dj does have a direct effect on the reaction function of firm j, but not



























Since we require that pi∗i > 0 for all ω, we have p
∗
i > ω. This implies, from (12), that
Assumption 1 is satisfied.








ωˆ = p∗ − 3d







Equilibrium profits now equal









Therefore, when d < 2, we have pi∗(d, d, ω) > d, so the firm is always able to repay its debt.












which is negative for all ω ∈ [0, 1] and d ≥ 0. Hence, Assumption 2 is satisfied.
For the expected repayment to the debtholders, we have
R(d, d) =




















12d+ 25 + 5
)
(5− 2ω)− 6d)) dω if 2 < d < 8
=
{










(3d+ 1) if 2 < d < 8.




















) ≈ 1.7364. Firms earn strictly
positive expected profits, which equal approximately 0.0476. In a model with internal
funds, equilibrium consumer prices are p∗(0, 0) = 5
2
, which is higher than prices in a model
with debt. The same consumer prices would prevail with a beauty contest. With internal
funds, bids equal bint = Eω(pi
∗(0, 0)) = 10
3
, which is higher than in a model with debt, and
expected firm profits are driven to zero.
23
5.3 Cournot competition with cost uncertainty
Consider quantity competition among the two firms, i = 1, 2. Suppose inverse demand is
p = 3− q1 − q2. (13)
Again, we assume uncertainty about a common and fixed level of marginal cost c, so ω ≡ c.
Moreover, we again assume f(ω) = 1 on [0,1]. Operating profits then are
pii(qi, qj, ω) = (3− qi − qj − ω) qi (14)
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. From this expression,











(qi (3− qi − qj)− di)2 .
Again, taking the first-order condition yields four possible solutions, three of which can be










(3− qj)2 + 12di.

















With quantity competition, the proof of Lemma 2 implies that q∗i is decreasing, and q
∗
j is
increasing in dj. Also note that dj does have a direct effect on the reaction function of firm












(3− qj)2 + 12di + (3− qj)√









Since we require that pi∗i > 0 for all ω, we have p
∗
i > ω. This implies that, from (13) and
(15), we have that Assumption 1 is satisfied.









To have pi∗ > 0 for all ω, we need 3− 2q∗ − 1 > 0, hence d < 1. Further note























which is strictly negative for all ω ∈ [0, 1] and d ≥ 0. Hence, Assumption 2 is satisfied.
It is easy to see that with d ≤ 5/18, the firms are always able to repay their debt.
Debtholder revenues can be shown to equal
R(d, d) =
{





220d− 3− (√16d+ 9) (36d+ 1)) if 5
18
< d < 1.
Maximizing with respect to d yields d∗ ' 0.80818, b∗ = R(d∗, d∗) ' 0.52915, and q∗ '
0.96038. Firms earn strictly positive expected profits, which equal approximately 0.0271. In
a model with internal funds, equilibrium quantities are q∗(0, 0) = 3
4
, which is lower than
quantities in a model with debt, and hence prices will be higher than in a model with debt.
With internal funds, bids equal bint = Eω(pi
∗(0, 0)) = 3
4
, which is higher than in a model
with debt, and expected firm profits are driven to zero.
5.4 Cournot competition with demand uncertainty
Consider quantity competition among the two firms, i = 1, 2. Suppose inverse demand is
p = 2 + α− qi − qj,
Assume marginal costs are zero and f(α) = 1 on [0,1]. Operating profits then are
pii(qi, qj, α) = (2 + α− qi − qj) qi
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i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Note that an increase in α increases profits. Therefore, we define
ω ≡ 1−α: higher values of ω then imply lower profits, as our analysis requires. The profit
function then becomes
pii(qi, qj, ω) = (3− ω − qi − qj) qi.
Note that this problem is analytically identical to the one we considered in the previous
example. Hence, also in this example, all our assumptions are satisfied, and we obtain the
same equilibrium as in our example with Cournot competition and cost uncertainty.
6 An alternative specification
Above, we solved our model for the case in which more debt induces firms to compete more
aggressively. Yet, there may also be cases in which more debt induces firms to compete
less aggressively. Showalter (1995) shows that this is the case with Bertrand competition
with differentiated products, and uncertainty about demand. It is interesting to see how
this affects the outcome of our model. We study that issue in this section, and thus replace
Assumption 3 with the following:




We will discuss our results solely in terms of price competition, as we are not aware
of any models with quantity competition for which Assumption 4 is satisfied. All other
assumptions are maintained. We now have the following lemmas. The proofs of Lemmas
6 through 9 are straightforward variations on the equivalent lemmas in the analysis above,
and are therefore omitted. All other proofs are in the appendix. In each lemma and
theorem that follows, we assume that Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 are satisfied.
First we have that a firm’s reaction curve shifts outwards as its level of debt increases:




> 0 if di ∈ [0, d˜i(dj)]
= 0 if di > d˜i(dj).
26
This causes a firm’s operating profits to increase as its competitor’s debt level increases:
Lemma 7 An increase in a firm’s debt level increases the competitor’s equilibrium oper-
ating profits:
∂pi∗i (di, dj, ω)
∂dj
{
> 0 if di ∈ [0, d˜i(dj)],
= 0 otherwise,
∀ω ∈ [ω, ω¯].
The effect of an increase in the common debt level is also opposite to that in the previous
section:






> 0 if d ∈ [0, d˜],
= 0 otherwise.
We also have:
Lemma 9 An increase in the amount of debt that a firm holds, increases the expected




> 0 if di ∈ [0, d˜i(dj)],
= 0 otherwise.
The intuition is very similar to that in section 3. From Lemma 7, we now have that for
every realization of ω, the operating profits of the other firm increase in dj. Hence, the
probability that that firm will be able to repay its debt increases, as do the profits that
debtholders can capture if the firm cannot fully repay its debt.
In this case, R(d, d) is strictly increasing on the relevant interval:




> 0 if d ∈ [0, d˜],
= 0 otherwise.
This lemma has some important implications. For example, it immediately implies that
dR = d˜. For the equilibrium of our model, we again have:
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Theorem 4 An equilibrium of our model is given by
1. B∗k = bR ≡ maxdR(d, d), for k = 1, . . . , N,
2. d∗i = dR ≡ min {d : d ∈ argmaxdR(d, d)} , for i = 1, 2,




i ), for i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
However, we now have:
Theorem 5 In the equilibrium described in Theorem 4, firms make zero expected net prof-
its.
Theorem 6 The equilibrium described in Theorem 4 is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Hence, we again have a unique symmetric equilibrium of the auction stage. All firms
submit the same bid, and the firms that win the auction choose the same debt level. That
debt level is a common debt level that maximizes expected repayment to the debtholders.
Yet, different from the previous case, debtholders’ profits are driven to zero. At the auction
stage, firms will increase their bids as long as they are still able to obtain financing, that
is, up to the point where expected net profits of debtholders are zero.
The outcome is depicted in Figure 2. Again, a firm’s expected operating profits
Eω (pi
∗(d, d)) are depicted as a function of a common debt level d. Now we have that Eω (pi∗)
is increasing in d, using Lemma 8. Out of expected operating profits, the amount R flows
to debtholders. The firm is left with expected net firm profits Π, which equal the difference
between Eω (pi





firms’ behavior does not change beyond d˜, we have that for all d > d˜, Eω[pi
∗(d, d, ω)] =
R (d, d) = Eω[pi
∗(d˜, d˜, ω)].
We now have that R is increasing for all d < d˜, which implies that dR = d˜. Intuitively,
this can be seen as follows. Suppose that we have d = d˜. When we decrease d from d˜ to









Figure 2: Solving the model for the alternative specification.
if firms are able to repay their debt, debtholders receive a lower amount. Hence, R then
decreases. Again, in equilibrium we must have that both firms submit bR, with the same
argument as in the previous case. But now, since dR coincides with d˜, it no longer implies
that firms have positive expected profits. There is no longer a moral hazard problem, as
higher debt levels only increase equilibrium firm profits. Therefore, we no longer have
credit rationing.
It is easy to see that higher debt levels now imply higher consumer prices. This directly
implies that, in the set-up that we have here, consumer prices will be lower with a beauty
contest than they are with an auction with debt. Consumer prices with an auction with
internal funds are equal to those with a beauty contest, and lower than those with an
auction with debt. From Figure 2, it is also easy to see that auction revenues will be lower
with internal funds than with debt.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to find numerical examples for this case. Solving a
simple linear Hotelling model with demand uncertainty, for example, involves solving a
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fourth-order polynomial, for which we are not able to find an analytical solution.
7 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we considered license auctions in which winning firms have to take on debt in
order to finance their bids. Since debt has a strategic effect in the aftermarket, it will also
affect the outcome of the auction. When debt induces firms to compete more aggressively,
there is a negative relation between consumer prices and the fees paid at the auction. Thus,
higher fees imply lower prices for consumers. Even though firms are completely symmetric,
expected equilibrium profits are strictly positive. This is due to credit rationing. Winning
bidders, even though they make positive expected profits, will not be outbid. Any higher
bid would yield a debt level that implies negative net expected profits for debtholders, and
therefore financing cannot be obtained. We also showed that auction revenues are lower if
firms finance bids by taking on debt rather than through internal funds. Consumer prices
are lower with an auction with debt, than they are with a beauty contest or with an auction
with internal funds.
The results change, however, when debt induces firms to compete less aggressively. In
that case, there is no credit rationing, so expected firm profits are driven to zero. Auction
revenues now are higher if firms finance bids by taking on debt rather than through internal
funds. Consumer prices are higher with an auction with debt than they are with a beauty
contest, or with an auction with internal funds.
These results suggest that, in auction design, it is important to realize how winners
will finance their bids. When external finance is used, results from standard auction
theory, implicitly based on internal finance, do not necessarily apply. However, it is not
straightforward to see what this implies for social welfare. In an auction with debt, prices
may be lower in equilibrium, but the probability that firms go bankrupt increases.
Our model can be extended in a number of ways. One straightforward extension con-
cerns the number of licenses that is being sold. In our model, N > 2 potential entrants
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compete for 2 licenses. Alternatively, they could compete for n licenses, with 2 ≤ n < N .
On the output market, n firms would then compete. In this setup, there would still be a
strategic effect of debt. However, an increase in n will imply a decrease in the bids because
of lower expected operating profits, and thus a decrease in the debt level. Thus, an increase
in n weakens the strategic effects of debt which may decrease firms’ equilibrium profits.
It would also be interesting to look at asymmetries in the amount of internal funds
that firms have, for example by looking at a case in which some firms are able to fully (or
partially) finance their bids through internal funds, whereas other firms have to finance
their entire bid on the credit market. One possible interpretation of such a scenario is that
incumbent firms have their own funds, whereas potential entrants need debt financing.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Consider the case in which di ≤ d˜i(dj). The first-order condition














A similar equality holds for firm j. This system of two equations can be solved using
























Stability of the equilibrium implies that H > 0 (see e.g. Tirole, 1988, p. 324, fn. 37). The
second-order conditions (SOCs) are ∂2Πi/∂a
2
i < 0. From (17) we then have that the sign
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of dai/ddi is the same as the sign of ∂
2Πi/∂di∂ai. To sign this expression, consider the






∂pii (ai, aj, ω)
∂ai





∂pii (ai, aj, ω)
∂ai
f(ω) dω = 0, (18)
where the second equality follows from the fact that
pii(ai, aj, ωˆi) = di. (19)




∂pii (ai, aj, ωˆi)
∂ai
· f(ωˆi) · ∂ωˆi
∂di
. (20)
This derivative equals the product of three terms. We consider the sign of each in turn,






so ∂ωˆi/∂di = [∂pii (ai, aj, ωˆi) /∂ωˆi]
−1 < 0, hence the last term of (20) is negative. The
second term is clearly positive: f(ωˆi) > 0, provided ωˆi ∈ (ω, ω¯). Finally, consider the sign




< 0 if ai ≡ qi,
> 0 if ai ≡ pi.
Thus, ∂pii (ai, aj, ω) /∂ai is decreasing in ω in case of quantity competition (ai ≡ qi) and
increasing in ω in case of price competition (ai ≡ pi). Consider the integral in (18). With
quantity competition, we have that the integrand is decreasing, and the integral equals zero.
This necessarily implies that the integrand is negative when evaluated in the upper limit
of the integral, hence ∂pii (ai, aj, ωˆi) /∂ai < 0. From (20), we then have ∂
2Πi/∂di∂ai > 0. In
turn, this implies from (17) that indeed dai/ddi > 0.With price competition, the integrand
in (18) is increasing, while the integral is zero. This implies that the integrand is positive
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when evaluated in ωˆi, so ∂pii (ai, aj, ωˆi) /∂ai > 0. From (20), we then have ∂
2Πi/∂di∂ai < 0.
In turn, this implies from (17) that indeed dβi/ddi < 0.
For di ≥ d˜i(dj), the result is trivial. By assumption, an increase in di does not affect
ai, hence it does not affect the reaction function βi.
Proof of Lemma 2 The equilibrium of the competition stage is determined by the
intersection of the best-reply functions. Note that the best-reply function of firm i is
derived from the maximization of Πi (ai, aj, di). First consider the case of price competition.
Suppose that firm j faces an infinitesimally small increase in its debt level from dOj to d
N
j ,
so dNj > d
O
j , with d
O













Firm i’s best-reply function is left unaffected by the change in firm j’s debt level. Denote



































































∂pi∗i (di, dj, ω)
∂dj






∂pi∗i (di, dj, ω)
∂dj
f(ω) dω < 0, (21)
where the second equality follows from the fact that pi∗i (di, dj, ωˆi) = di. Using Assumption
1, this implies that pi∗i (di, dj, ω) is decreasing in dj for any ω.
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Now consider the quantity competition case. Suppose firm j faces an infinitesimally
small increase in its debt level from dOj to d
N
j , with d
O













. Firm i’s best-reply function is again left unaffected by the











. Since both best-reply functions are


















































so Πi (di, dj) is decreasing in dj. Again, using (3) and Assumption 1, this implies that
pi∗i (di, dj, ω) is decreasing in dj for any ω.
For di ≥ d˜i(dj), the result is trivial. By assumption, an increase in di does not affect
ai, hence it does not affect aj, so profits will also be unaffected.
Proof of Lemma 3 First consider the case of price competition. From Lemma 1,
an increase in firm i’s debt level shifts its best-reply function downwards. Since best-reply
functions are upward sloping, firms are symmetric, and di = dj ≡ d, an increase in d must




Thus, pm is the price that, if set by both firms, maximizes their expected operating profits.
Note that expected operating profits are equal to firm profits in the case of zero debt:
Eω(pi(p, p)) = Π(p, p, 0). Using symmetry between the two firms and the condition for
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stability of the Nash equilibrium, we then have that Eω(pi(p, p)) is increasing in p for
p < pm.
Obviously, the equilibrium price in a duopoly is strictly lower than the price that
maximizes joint profits,11 hence p∗(0, 0) < pm = argmaxΠ(p, p, 0). With dp∗(d, d)/dd < 0,
this implies that p∗(d, d) < pm for all d, and hence dEω(pi∗(d, d))/dd < 0.
For the case of quantity competition, we have that best-reply functions are downward
sloping and, from Lemma 1, that an increase in d leads to an upward shift in a firm’s best-





Thus, qm is the price that, if set by each individual firm, maximizes the firms’ expected
operating profits. Concavity of pi(q, q) implies that Eω(pi(q, q)) is decreasing in q for q >
qm. Obviously, the equilibrium quantity a firm sets in a duopoly is strictly higher than
the quantity each firm sets when joint profits are maximized12, hence q∗(0, 0) > qm ≡
argmaxΠi(p, p, 0). With dq
∗(d, d)/dd > 0, this implies that q∗(d, d) > qm for all d, and
hence dEω(pi
∗(d, d))/dd < 0.











as ∂Πi/∂pj > 0, since an increase in js price will increase is profits. Strict concavity then implies that the
joint-profit maximizing price pm is strictly higher than p∗.











as ∂Πi/∂qj < 0, since an increase in js quantity will decrease is profits. Strict concavity then implies that
the joint-profit maximizing quantity qm is strictly lower than q∗.
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Proof of Lemma 4 Using Leibniz’s rule, from (2) the partial derivative of Ri(di, dj)




∂ Pr(ω ≤ ωˆi)
∂dj






∂pi∗i (di, dj, ω)
∂dj
f(ω) dω.
Since pi∗i (di, dj, ωˆi) = di and because f(ω) is the probability density function of ω, the first
and second terms cancel out. Thus, only the third term remains. This term is negative
because of Lemma 2. For dj > d˜j, a change in dj does not affect a
∗
j , which implies that
Ri(di, dj) is also unaffected.
Proof of Lemma 5 Since di < dR, we have from (7) that Ri(di, di) < Ri(dR, dR),
and from Lemma 4 that Ri(di, dR) < Ri(di, di) since dR ≤ d˜ by construction. Hence
Ri(di, dR) < Ri(dR, dR).
Proof of Theorem 1 To prove that this is an equilibrium, we need that the three
conditions in definition 1 are satisfied. Equilibrium at the competition stage holds by
definition for the a∗i defined in the Theorem. For the debt stage, we need to show that
(dR, dR) is an equilibrium, given that both firms have submitted a bid bR in the auction
stage. For the auction stage, we need to show that no firm is willing to submit a higher
bid and that firms submitting bR make nonnegative profits.
Consider the debt stage. Equilibrium debts (d1, d2) have to satisfy
R1(d1, d2) ≥ bR, (22)
and
R2(d2, d1) ≥ bR. (23)
Consider firm 1’s best reply to d2 = dR. With d1 < dR, we have from Lemma 5 that
R1(d1, d2) < R1(dR, dR) = bR, contradicting (22). Consider the possibility to set d1 > dR.
With dR < d˜(dR), we have from Lemma 4 for any d1 > dR that R2(dR, d1) < R2(dR, dR)
contradicting (23). With dR = d˜(dR), profits for firm 1 would be zero for any d1 ≥ dR,
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hence firm 1 would be indifferent between setting any d1 ≥ dR, so (22) and (23) hold with
equality. With d1 = dR, we also have that both (22) and (23) hold with equality. Hence
(dR, dR) is an equilibrium for the debt stage.
Now consider the auction stage. First note that in the equilibrium suggested in Theorem
1, trivially, a firm cannot make negative profits if all firms submit bR; firms will be able
to find financing, and limited liability in the competition stage precludes negative profits.
Hence, a firm cannot strictly improve by submitting a lower bid and losing the auction.
Consider a firm that defects by submitting a bid b > bR, so we have some b1 > bR and
b2 = bR. The conditions (6) imply that to be able to obtain financing for both firms in the
new situation, we need to find a (d1, d2) such that
R1(d1, d2) ≥ b1 > bR, (24)
and
R2(d2, d1) ≥ bR. (25)
The argument proceeds with the following steps:
1. There is no such (d1, d2) with d1 = d2. — With d1 = d2, we immediately have from
the definition of dR that R1(d1, d2) ≤ R1(dR, dR), contradicting (24).
2. There is no such (d1, d2) with either d1 = dR or d2 = dR. — Without loss of general-
ity, assume d2 = dR. If d1 < dR, we have from Lemma 5 that R1(d1, dR) < R1(dR, dR),
contradicting (24). If d1 > dR, we consider two subcases.
(a) Suppose dR < d˜1(dR). In this case, a change in firm 1s debt level from dR to d1
will have an effect on firm 1’s behavior in the competition stage. From Lemma
4, we then have R2(dR, d1) < R2(dR, dR), contradicting (25).
(b) Suppose dR ≥ d˜1(dR). In this case, a change in firm 1s debt level from dR to
d1 will not have an effect on firm 1’s behavior in the competition stage. Hence
R2(dR, d1) = R2(dR, dR) and R1(d1, dR) = R1(dR, dR), contradicting (24).
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3. There is no such (d1, d2) with d1 > dR and d2 > dR. — Assume d1 > d2 > dR. With
similar arguments as those used below, we can also rule out the case d2 > d1 > dR.
We consider two subcases:
(a) Suppose d2 < d˜1(d2). Consider a decrease in firm 1’s debt level from d1 to d2.
This will have an effect on firm 1’s behavior in the competition stage. From
Lemma 4, we then have R2(d2, d1) < R2(d2, d2). From the definition of dR,
we have R2(d2, d2) ≤ R2(dR, dR). Hence R2(d2, d1) < R2(dR, dR), contradicting
(25).
(b) Suppose d2 ≥ d˜1(d2). In this case, a change in firm 1s debt level from d1
to d2 will not have an effect of firm 1’s behavior in the competition stage.
Hence R1(d1, d2) = R1(d2, d2). Using the definition of dR, we have R1(d2, d2) ≤
R1(dR, dR), which implies R1(d1, d2) ≤ R1(dR, dR), contradicting (24).
4. There is no such (d1, d2) with d1 < dR and d2 < dR. — Suppose d1 < d2 < dR.
Note that we necessarily have dR ≤ d˜(dR). From Lemma 4, R1(d1, d2) < R1(d1, dR).
From Lemma 5, R1(d1, dR) < R1(dR, dR), so R1(d1, d2) ≤ R1(dR, dR), which implies
R1(d1, d2) < bR, contradicting (24). With the same arguments, the case d2 < d1 < dR
contradicts (25).
5. There is no such (d1, d2) with either d1 < dR < d2 or d2 < dR < d1. — Con-
sider the first possibility. From Lemma 4, R1(d1, d2) ≤ R1(d1, dR). From Lemma 5,
R1(d1, dR) < R1(dR, dR). Hence R1(d1, d2) < R1(dR, dR), contradicting (24). With
the same arguments, the case d2 < dR < d1 contradicts (25).
Proof of Theorem 2 If both firms’ debt equals dR, the net profits to a firm Π(a
∗, a∗, dR)
will be strictly positive if and only if ωˆ(dR, dR) > ω. From Assumption 2 and Lemma 3, we
have that pi∗(d, d, ω) is strictly decreasing in d for all ω. Thus ωˆ(d, d) is strictly decreasing
in d, and to have ωˆ(dR, dR) > ω, we need dR < d˜. We will show that this is indeed the
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case. If d1 = d2 = d, the debtholders lending to firm i have expected revenue
R(d, d) = Pr(ω ≤ ωˆ(d, d))d+
∫ ω¯
ωˆ(d,d)
pi∗(d, d, ω)f(ω) dω.




∂ Pr(ω ≤ ωˆ)
∂d























= Pr(ω ≤ ω¯) = 1. (27)















where the inequality follows from Lemma 3. Combining (27) and (28), by continuity there
must be at least one dˇ ∈ (0, d˜) where dR(d, d)/dd evaluated in d = dˇ equals zero, and
moreover d2R(d, d)/dd2 evaluated in d = dˇ is negative. Combined with (28), this implies
that indeed dR < d˜, which establishes the result.
Proof of Theorem 3 Consider some other symmetric candidate equilibrium in which
every bidder bids some b 6= bR. First, consider the case b > bR. With bR = maxdR(d, d),
this implies that there is no symmetric equilibrium of the debt stage in which both firms
can find financing. Second, consider the case b < bR. Consider one of the bidders at the
auction, say firm 1. Such a firm can make sure to be among the winners of the auction
by bidding bR. The debt market is willing to finance the two winning bids b and bR, since
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R(dR, dR) = bR > b. Therefore, consider as a candidate equilibrium for the debt stage
(d1, d2) = (dR, dR). From Theorem 2, firm 1 then makes positive profits equal to Π(dR, dR).
Yet, we may have that firm 2 prefers to defect from this candidate equilibrium of the debt
stage, setting a different d2. It cannot choose d2 > dR: using Lemma 4 and the fact that
dR < d˜ (see proof of the previous theorem), we would then have R1(dR, d2) < R1(dR, dR),
so firm 1 cannot find financing. If firm 2 would prefer some d2 < dR, then that would relax
firm 1s financing constraint, while it would increase firm 1’s profits, using (21). Thus, by
setting d1 = dR, firm 1 can secure profits of at least Π(dR, dR) > 0. Hence, firm 1 can
indeed make positive profits by submitting a higher bid, which establishes uniqueness at
the auction stage. If the maximizer of R(d, d) is unique, we immediately have uniqueness
of the equilibrium. If it is not, we still have that the equilibrium to the auction stage is
unique, but that each of the maximizers of R(d, d) is an equilibrium at the debt stage.




Pr(ω ≤ ωˆ(d, d))d+
∫ ω¯
ωˆ(d,d)








pi∗i (dR, dR, ω)f(ω) dω.
With internal funds, since all firms are identical and information is symmetric, profits will




pi∗(0, 0, ω)f(ω) dω.
We now have
bR < Eω(pi
∗(dR, dR)) < Eω(pi∗(0, 0)) = bint.
The first inequality follows from the definitions of bR and the fact that dR < pi
∗(dR, dR, ω)
for ω < ωˆ(dR, dR) The second inequality follows from Lemma 3. This establishes the
first statement in the corollary. For the second statement, note that with internal funds,
d = 0 < dR. The result then follows from proposition 1.
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Proof of Lemma 10 Also in this case, dR(d, d)/dd is given by (26), i.e.
dR(d, d)
dd






Obviously Pr(ω ≤ ωˆ) ≥ 0. From Assumption 2 and Lemma 8, we have dpi∗(d, d, ω)/dd > 0,
which establishes the result.
Proof of Theorem 4 To prove that this is an equilibrium, we need that the three
conditions in definition 1 are satisfied. Equilibrium at the competition stage holds trivially.
For the debt stage, we need to show that (dR, dR) is an equilibrium, given that both firms
have submitted a bid bR in the auction stage. For the auction stage, we need to show that
no firm is willing to submit a higher bid and that firms submitting bR make nonnegative
profits.
Consider the debt stage. Equilibrium debts (d1, d2) have to satisfy
R1(d1, d2) ≥ bR, (29)
and
R2(d2, d1) ≥ bR. (30)
Consider firm 1’s best reply to d2 = dR. With d1 < dR, we have from Lemma 9 that
R2(d2, d1) < R2(dR, dR), contradicting (30). With d1 > dR, the fact that dR = d˜ implies
that R1(d1, d2) = R1(dR, dR). Hence dR is a weak best reply to dR, which implies that
(dR, dR) is an equilibrium for the debt stage.
Now consider the auction stage. First note that in the candidate equilibrium considered
in the theorem, trivially, a firm cannot make negative profits; firms will be able to find
financing, and limited liability in the competition stage precludes negative profits. Hence,
a firm cannot strictly improve by submitting a lower bid and losing the auction. Consider
a firm that defects by submitting a bid b > bR, so we have b1 > bR and b2 = bR. The
conditions (6) imply that to be able to have financing for both firms in the new situation,
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we need to find a (d1, d2) such that
R1(d1, d2) ≥ b1 > bR, (31)
and
R2(d2, d1) ≥ bR. (32)
The argument proceeds in the following steps:
1. There is no such (d1, d2) with d1 = d2. With d1 = d2, we immediately have, from
dR = argmaxR(d, d), that R1(d1, d2) ≤ R1(dR, dR), contradicting (31).
2. There is no such (d1, d2) with d2 < d1. In this case, we have R1(d1, d2) ≤ R1(d1, d1) ≤
R1(dR, dR), with the first inequality following from Lemma 9, and the second from
the definition of dR. This contradicts (31).
3. There is no such (d1, d2) with d1 < d2. Consider two subcases:
(a) d1 < d˜1(d2). In that case R2(d2, d1) < R2(d2, d2) ≤ R2(dR, dR), with the first
inequality following from Lemma 9, and the second from the definition of dR.
This contradicts (32).
(b) d1 ≥ d˜1(d2). In that case R1(d1, d2) = R1(d2, d2) ≤ R1(dR, dR), where the
equality follows from Lemma 9, and the inequality from the definition of dR.
This contradicts (31).
Proof of Theorem 5 Since dR = d˜, we have ωˆ(dR, dR) = ω. Thus, firms never
make strictly positive profits, regardless of the realization of ω. With limited liability, that
implies that their expected profits are zero.
Proof of Theorem 6 Consider some other symmetric candidate equilibrium in which
every bidder bids some b 6= bR. First, consider the case b > bR. With bR = maxdR(d, d),
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this implies that there is no symmetric equilibrium of the debt stage in which both firms
can find financing. Second, consider the case b < bR. Consider one of the other bidders
at the auction, say firm 1. Such a firm can make sure to be among the winners of the
auction by bidding b + ε. Denote as dˆ the debt level for which R(dˆ, dˆ) = b + ε. Thus,
both firms can find financing with d = dˆ. With R(dˆ, dˆ) < bR, we have from Lemma 10
that dˆ < dR, which implies that, at this financing arrangement, both winning firms make
strictly positive profits. Yet, we may have that firm 2 prefers to defect from this candidate
equilibrium of the debt stage, setting a different d2. It cannot choose d2 > dˆ: using Lemma
9, that would imply that firm 1 can no longer find financing. It may prefer some d2 < dˆ.
In that case, firm 1’s profits would even be higher, using 7. This implies that a case in
which all firms bid the same b < bR is not a Nash equilibrium.
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